|
The introduction announces a presentation of New Testament
teaching on divorce and remarriage 'as it would have been understood
by its original readers'. From the start, there is also an emphasis
on pastoral implications. Next, the introduction anticipates the
conclusions: Jesus and Paul affirmed the Old Testament grounds for
divorce, i. e. 'adultery and neglect or abuse', while condemning
divorce 'without valid grounds' and discouraging 'divorce for valid
grounds'. Subsequent Christian tradition, however, would have become
much more restrictive on divorce and remarriage than this teaching
from the Old Testament and the New. The legitimacy of the pastoral
concern expressed here is beyond debate, but the asserted harmony of
Old Testament and New Testament teaching is problematic, and it is
based on incorrect analysis of the sources.
The successive
chapters deal with 'The Ancient Near East'; 'The Pentateuch'; 'The
Later Prophets'; the 'Intertestamental Period': 'Rabbinic Teaching';
'Jesus' Teaching'; 'Paul's Teaching'; and 'Marriage Vows'. They
offer a wealth of data from the relevant Jewish, Pagan and Christian
sources, displaying much learning and ingenuity, occasional lapses
notwithstanding (twice spelling shana instead of sana for the Hebrew
verb 'hate', 78 and 7, n. 30; qol for qal vahomer, 100; death
penalty for rape of a 'virgin' instead of a betrothed virgin,
23).
A fundamental Old Testament passage frequently quoted in
the book is Deut 24:1-4, a complex piece of case law. It is about a
woman who is divorced 'because of some indecency', remarries, but
then sees her second marriage terminated because her husband
'dislikes' and divorces her, or just because he dies; the first and
second divorce are both formalised by 'a bill of divorce', which of
course is not necessary when the husband dies. When arrived at this
point, thus Deuteronomy, the first husband can not remarry the
woman. The reason given is 'she has been defiled'. There seems to be
no objection to her being remarried to another man.
This is
hard to understand. Why would a divorcee be more 'defiled' for a
former husband than for a new one? A coherent explanation, quoted
repeatedly with approval by I.-B., was given by R. Westbrook ('The
Prohibition on Restoration of Marriage in Deuteronomy 24:1-4',
Scripta hierosolymitana 31 [1986], 387-405). When reviewing it we
must keep in mind, as I.-B. also reminds us (20 f.), that Old
Testament law is not systematic but rather cites exceptional cases
based on implicit rules every-one would know.
Westbrook
observes that according to Deuteronomy, marria-ge ends just as
legally by divorce as by death of the husband. But there is a
difference between the two divorces; the first one is 'because of
some indecency', the second 'because he dislikes her'. The term
'dislike' or 'hate' (Hebrew sana) in ancient Near Eastern law
denotes a subjective ground for divorce that would oblige the
husband to pay the woman a sum equalling at least the dowry. This is
also the case in rabbinic law (cf. the ketubba), and therefore
probably tacitly supposed in the second divorce in Deut 24. The
first divorce, however, was occasioned by 'some indecency' committed
by the wife, or in Westbrook's terms by objective grounds, which by
Near Eastern and rabbinic law (Mishna Ketubbot 7:6) justifies
divorce without financial re-compensation. The same seems
presupposed in Deut 24: the first husband has divorced her 'because
of some indecency'— apparently without paying the established sum -
and if he would remarry her now, he would profit from the money the
termination of her second marriage entitled her to! The prohibition
is summarised, thus Westbrook, in the phrase hutama'a that must mean
'she was declared to be unclean' - i. e. by her first
husband.
I.-B. introduces a different terminology and
completely mis-ses the point of Westbrook's analysis; 'The first
marriage ended when the man cited a valid ground for divorce ... The
second marriage ended without any valid grounds for divorce' (7; cf.
23, 56 f.; emphasis added). I.-B. also completely ignores the fact
that the >hate divorces though subjectively motivated, is
accepted as legal and valid - as distinct, to be sure, from New
Testament teaching.
Very important evidence is found in Qumran,
because it stands chronologically between the Old and New Testament.
Two related passages prohibit 'taking two wives during their
lifetime' (CD 4:20-5:2; 11QTemp 57:17 f.). The first passage aims at
priests in Jerusalem and adduces three arguments: (1) the principle
of creation is: 'male and female He created them' (Gen 1:27); (2)
they came 'two by two' into Noah's ark (Gen 7:9); and (3) the king
'must not multiply wives' (Deut 17:17). The last argument is also
brought by the second passage, which indeed speaks about the king's
obligation to monogamy, but implicitly excludes divorce as well. The
first passage reads as being primarily directed against divorce,
because polygamy is alluded to only in its third quote. According to
most commentators, therefore, these passages exclude both polygamy
and divorce. I.-B., however, peremptorily states that only monogamy
is discussed.
The rabbinic evidence is also misread. Ignoring
the formal acceptance of 'hate divorce' in Old Testament law, I.-B.
attributes the Pharisaic-rabbinic school of Hillel with the
'invention of a new type of divorce, called the "any matter"
divorce' (110). He nevertheless notes (115) that both Philo and
Josephus also supported this type of divorce, and elsewhere in a
footnote (154, n. 44) he concedes that this indicates it was
wide-spread, even adding Sir 25:26 which proves its existence before
the school of Hillel. If we take in the reality of the Old Testament
acceptance, it appears that this type of divorce had been in use all
along and that the Hillelites merely maintained it over against the
Shammaites who wished to restrict the grounds for divorce to 'some
indecency' in the sexual sense. Hence the asser-tion that the
Hillelites 'invented' it floats in the air.
The Gospe!
material is of course crucial to the book. Here, the argument is
particularly tortuous as regards the differences between the various
documents. Throughout, I.-B. sticks to Matthew's version that Jesus
accepts divorce 'in case of porneia' or 'indecency', which evidently
fits better with the marriage the-ology he wishes to develop but
ignores the fact that Mark, Luke and Paul do not mention the
Matthaean clause (see Mt 5:32; 19:9; Mk 10:11; Lk 16:18; ICor 7:10
f.). The reader, who is informed that the author accepts the strong
arguments to the effect that the clause was added in Matthew, is
nevertheless invited to accept that the Matthaean version represents
more aspects of the original debates (171-173, cf.
134).
I.-B.'s pastoral concern is commendable. But I doubt
that it is helped by ignoring past and present differences of
opinion on divorce and remarriage, both in Judaism and Christianity.
On the contrary, could Christians not, inspired by Jewish tradition,
learn to distinguish between the necessity of creating basic order
in society (clarifying the boundaries of marriage, not least on
behalf of the offspring) on the one hand, and on the other, the
adhortation to adhere to the biblical ideal of lifelong monogamy
(correctly sensed in Mal 2:14-16; 54-58)? It would resemble Paul's
two levels of instruction throughout ICor 7, i. e. the rule accepted
in the Church and his own stricter 'opinion'. Indeed, it would be
what Jesus seems to suggest: 'Moses wrote his di-vorce ruling for
our hardness of heart' (Mk 10:5).
|
|
